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Abstract— Demand response is a key aspect of the smart
grid, facilitating better load-supply matching, higher retailer
and consumer utilities and a more robust power grid. The
energy retailer is primarily tasked with demand response and
in most cases, his tool of choice to exercise control is the
price. In this paper, we will investigate the dynamics of the
retail market from a game theoretic viewpoint. Our setup
consists of a retailer and several consumers who purchase
power from the retailer, the former being the leader and the
latter being followers in a classic Stackelberg game. A complete
information setup is assumed where two-way information flow
happens easily and instantaneously. We devise pricing strategies
for the retailer such that a fine balance is struck between
revenue and consumer welfare. Observations are made about
the performance of the grid under the said strategies. We
also investigate whether discriminatory pricing can be used
to boost both revenue and consumer welfare by reducing al-
locative inefficiencies. We extend our formulation to include the
scenario when consumers have inhouse generation capabilities
(prosumers) and can send back excess energy to the retailer
for reuse (net-metering). Simulation results are presented for
all formulations and meaningful observations are derived from
them.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The traditional power grid is becoming smarter where
users are now equipped with advanced metering infrastruc-
ture. The advent of home automation has enabled users
to control their consumption depending on the prices. The
retailer or utility company1 can also control the total con-
sumption by setting the price. For example, when the demand
is high, the retailer can set high prices in order to de-
incentivize the users to consume less. The retailer needs to
be profitable, otherwise, she cannot maintain the transmission
lines and distribution lines. However, electricity is essential
for sustainability, so a high price is not only detrimental to
users but it can also push the economy of a country down.
Hence, we need to maximize the users’ welfare simultane-
ously. Thus, we need to develop a pricing mechanism which
will try to maximize the retailer’s profit along with user’s
payoffs.
Due to the advent of smart meters, the retailer can now
charge different prices to different users. Such discriminatory
price mechanisms may increase the users’ payoff without
reducing the retailer’s profit. Several forms of discrimina-
tory price mechanisms can be observed in practice. For
example in India, tariffs vary depending on the consumption
level of the users. Further, researchers have argued that
different prices to different users can in fact increase the
efficiency[10]. We seek to answer the question whether
1We use terms retailer and utility company interchangeably
allowing prices to vary within a certain limit across different
users can result in gains in the users’ welfare or retailer’s
profit.
Users now have distributed energy resources such as
solar panels and wind energy generators. These users can
also feed back energy to the grid. Such users are better
known as ’prosumers’. Net-metering is a widely adopted
technique where the retailer buys energy from prosumers
at the retail rate. Thus, the retailer now needs to set prices
judiciously depending on whether prosumers are giving back
or consuming energy at a certain time instance. We need to
determine optimal price mechanisms for such scenarios.
B. Our approach
We consider a stylized model where a retailer sets a price
for each consumer in each time period. First, we consider
the case where no consumer can feed back energy to the
grid. We formulate the problem as a Stackelberg game where
the retailer selects a price, each user selects how much
to consume in each period by maximizing its own payoff.
The retailer’s optimization problem involves a weighted
average of the retailer’s profit and the users’ welfare. We
show that the optimization problem of the retailer is non-
convex even when the user’s optimization problem is convex.
Subsequently, we convexify the problem by introducing three
different types of modifications. The retailer can discriminate
among the users by charging different prices to different
users. However, we restrict the discrimination by an amount
η . Numerically, we evaluate how η can impact the retailer’s
profits and users’ payoffs.
Subsequently, we consider the scenario where the user can
also feed back energy to the grid. We investigate the net-
metering price mechanism where the selling price and the
buying price remain the same. Thus, if the retailer selects
a higher price, users can be incentivized to sell back more,
hence, it is not apriori clear which price will maximize the
retailer’s objective. We formulate the problem of determining
the optimal price of the retailer as an optimization problem
and convexify it with the methods described in the last
paragraph. The impact of this kind of pricing scheme on
different stakeholder metrics is evaluated.
C. Literature Review
Load profiling in the smart grid through design of demand
response programs has seen a lot of research effort over the
last decade. In this subsection, we will attempt to provide
the reader an overview of the research that already exists in
this area. The organization of this subsection is as follows :
we will start off by referring to a few review papers followed
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by a summary of recent work in Demand Response through
real-time pricing schemes. This will be followed by a short
review of game-theoretic techniques commonly adopted in
literature. The last segment will be dedicated to discussion
about distributed generation and how it has affected design
of DR programs.
[15] provides a comprehensive review of data mining
techniques that are useful for load profiling and customer
segmentation and how they have been used for designing
price-based and incentive-based DR programs. [1] sum-
marises some of the work that has been done with respect to
DR programs in smart grids equipped with renewable energy
resources(RERs). Successful DR implementations around the
world have also been analyzed. Readers can refer to [14] for
further reading.
[11] is an important paper when it comes to Real-time
pricing. It shows that under a Real-Time Pricing scheme, the
price function will be linear in consumption and rotationally
symmetric. [8] proves that a dynamic pricing strategy can
be designed in such a way that consumers’ selfish utility
maximization aligns with social utility maximization. A
distributed algorithm for joint computing of prices and usage
schedules is proposed. [9] deals in data centre demand
response, designing an appropriate prediction-based pricing
scheme that is robust to prediction errors.
The Stackelberg framework is one of the most com-
mon game theoretic approaches adopted in literature. [16]
develops a 2-stage problem for both pricing and energy
dispatch. Supplier-enduser interaction has been modelled by
a Stackelberg game, while robust optimization techniques
take care of market uncertainty. [3] explores the Stackelberg
formulation to solve an energy scheduling game. It builds
on a Day-Ahead pricing scheme, but also has a notion of a
price gap that gets updated on the basis of the real-time load
vector. This paper presents encouraging results on the the
Peak-to-Average Load ratio and the problem of ’rebound’
peaks. [12] provides a very good review on other popular
game theory techniques in DR-related problems.
Lately, the focus has shifted to distributed generation
capabilities. One such possibility is consumers who can
produce, or ’prosumers’. [7] conducts a simulation analysis
of the effects of distributed generation on the grid as a whole.
[17] and [6] discuss energy management systems for micro-
grids involving prosumers. Optimal pricing schemes under
net-metering have been discussed in [2]. With this basic
overview, we proceed to discuss how our model contributes
to the rich existing literature.
D. Original Contributions
To summarize, the main contributions of our paper are the
following–
• We consider a discriminatory price scenario where the
retailer can charge different prices to different users.
Even though the price is discriminatory, we show that
the price mechanism is fair as the users who have higher
valuation for demand, are priced higher. We empirically
evaluate the impact of the level of discrimination on the
users’ welfare and the retailer’s revenue.
• In the proposed formulation, we consider that the re-
tailer’s objective is to maximize the profit, minimize
the cost to serve the user’s demand, and maximize the
user’s welfare. We,numerically, evaluate how the price
mechanism impacts each of the objectives.
• We also consider the scenario where the users may have
renewable resources and can sell back energy to the grid.
We formulate a net metering scenario where the selling
price and the buying price are the same for each user.
We numerically evaluate the prices and show the impact
of discrimination on the amount sold to the retailer,
the consumption of the users, users’ welfare, and the
retailer’s revenue.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Entities
There is a retailer or utility company R who purchases
electricity from the wholesale Day-Ahead market and sup-
plies to a community of N consumers. Time is slotted. The
retailer selects a price for each period by anticipating the
amount of energy that will be consumed in that period. Note
that the duration of the period can be of any magnitude,
however, if the duration is small, a retailer may need to
compute prices a large number of times within a given day. In
every period k, she communicates her price to the consumers
based on which they choose their elastic demands for the said
period.
Every household also has an inelastic demand in each
period which needs to be satisfied. The examples of inelastic
loads are electricity required to switch on lights or TV. Total
demand for a household in a period consists of both elastic
and inelastic demand. An user may choose the temperature
setting of its household. Further, it can also choose how much
to use for charging the batteries of electric vehicles. Those
are a few examples of elastic demand.
B. Game Definition
Since all users and retailer are interested in optimizing
their own payoff, we formulate the problem as a game-
theoretic problem. The retailer, first, selects a price for a
period and the users then decide how much to consume
in that period . Thus, we formulate the game G as a
sequential game. There is a ’leader’ (retailer) who takes
the first turn at playing the game (by setting price) and the
’followers’ (consumers) respond accordingly (by deciding
their consumption). Due to hierarchy of players, G qualifies
as a Stackelberg game which can be solved by Backward
Induction. We assume that all players are rational and the
game is one with complete information.
We now define the strategy space of the players. The
retailer selects prices in each time period. The users decide
how much to consume in each time period. Note that the
retailer can charge different prices to different users. The
users optimize payoff functions in order to decide how much
to consume. We define the payoff functions of the users in
the subsequent section.
C. Notation Key
In this segment, we will define the notations elaborately.
Unless specified otherwise, notations will bear the same
meaning across the paper. Subscript i and superscript k mean
that the quantity pertains to the ith household in the kth period
of the day.
P(k)i - price per unit electricity charged by retailer
pb - base price charged by retailer per unit inelastic demand
p(k)i - additional price above base price charged by retailer
per unit elastic demand
Ps - energy buyback rate for retailer
X (k)i - purchase made from grid by consumer
Y (k)i - energy sold back by consumer to retailer
Z(k)i - net energy transaction from grid
s(k)i - inhouse solar generation
x(k)i - elastic demand of consumer
m(k)i - inelastic demand of consumer
η - level of price discrimination allowed
III. OPTIMAL PRICING WITH NO RENEWABLE
RESOURCES
First, we consider the scenario where users do not have
renewable resources. However, users are equipped with smart
devices and can optimize their consumption for a given
price. In the next section, we consider the scenario where
users have renewable resources. We, first, define the users’
objective and subsequently, we define the objective of the
retailer.
A. Decision of Consumers
For a given price pk, consumers decide how much to
consume. The decision is based on the convenience function
and the price pk. Each user derives some comfort from
consuming energy. We model this comfort level in monetary
terms using a convenience function. Convenience function is
used in Economics as well as for modeling the convenience
of users in the power grid([13], [4] and [5]). There is no
comfort obtained from inelastic demand because that is the
bare essential. So, convenience function is dependent only
on elastic demand. The convenience function C(.) must
have the following nice properties :
• C(0,ω(k)i ) = 0, i.e., the function has a fixed point at the
origin. If elastic demand is zero, convenience derived is
zero.
• dC(·)/dx(k)i ≥ 0. Convenience should be an increasing
function of elastic demand. If the demand is high, the
convenience of a user should be higher.
• d2C(·)/d(x(k)i )2 ≤ 0. The higher the consumption of
elastic demand, the lower the marginal convenience
derived from it.
• The convenience saturates once marginal convenience
goes to zero. Thus, if a user’s demand exceeds a certain
threshold, the demand will not fetch any additional
convenience to the users.
• C(·) is continuous and at least twice differentiable over
R. This is for the analysis.
Taking all the above into consideration, we define our
convenience function as :
C(x(k)i ,ωi) =
ω(k)i x(k)i −α
(x(k)i )
2
2 x
(k)
i ≤ ω
(k)
i
α
(ω(k)i )
2
2α x
(k)
i ≥ ω
(k)
i
α
ω(k)i is the consumer preference factor in period k and varies
across consumers, while α is a predetermined constant. This
form of quadratic convenience functions are common in the
smart grid literature([13], [4]).
Note that convenience function is also time dependent. A
user may be willing to consume more at some specific time
periods compared to other time periods. Hence, convenience
function may also vary over time. We have assumed the
convenience function is not correlated across different time
periods. The characterization of the price when the conve-
nience function is correlated across different time periods is
left for the future.
Definition 1: The consumer utility is defined as the dif-
ference between the convenience derived from the elastic
demand consumption and the total price paid for the con-
sumption. Hence, mathematically, the utility function is
U (k)i (x
(k)
i ,ω
(k)
i |pk) =C(x(k)i ,ω(k)i )− (pk)x(k)i (1)
Observation 1: The optimal user-end elastic demand con-
sumption in the kth period in response to price pk charged
by retailer is
xki = max(0,
ω(k)i − pk
α
). (2)
If ωki is higher, the consumption will be higher. On the other
hand, if the price is higher the consumption will be smaller.
The total consumption is scaled by α . Higher α means that
users are more likely to be satisfied with smaller level of
consumption, hence, optimal consumption is also smaller.
B. Retailer’s Decision
The retailer charges a price pb + p
(k)
i to consumer i in the
kth period for any consumption beyond the inelastic demand.
pb is a base price which accounts for the cost to sustain
the minimum consumption of the users. pb is not a decision
variable, rather, it is fixed. The reason behind fixing pb is that
the users need to consume the minimum amount regardless
of the value of pb. Thus, it would not be fair to the users if
retailer optimizes over pb.
Note that we consider that the retailer can charge different
prices to different users, This is a discriminatory pricing
model. Several kinds of discriminatory pricing models can be
seen in practice. For example, in India, people who consume
more pay larger prices compared to the ones who consume
less. Further, discriminatory pricing models are also proposed
by academics in order to achieve better efficiency [10]. We
also show that if a user consumes less its price will be
smaller at the same time period compared to the one
who consumes more.
The retailer decides over pki across the users and over
different time periods. In order to select prices, we assume
the following
Assumption 1: We assume that smart meters installed in
the households can accurately measure ωi’s and communi-
cate that intelligence to the retailer. This assumption helps
in making the game a complete information one.
Since the user’s convenience function is known to the
retailers, she also knows the optimal consumption for a given
price (Observation 1).
Retailer’s objectives: The retailer will obviously try to
maximize her profit which consists of the revenue (p(k)i +
pb)x
(k)
i . The retailer also incurs a cost for serving the
consumption x(k)i . Generally, the cost is quadratic, we also
assume the same. Additionally, the retailer needs to ensure
that the user’s welfare is maintained. In other words, the
user’s consumption should not be very far from the optimal
consumption level when the price is zero. The above may
be imposed by the government as part of a regulation since
electricity is an essential commodity.
Thus we have the following optimization problem for the
retailer :
Formulation 0:
maximize e1 · (∑
i
(p(k)i + pb)x
(k)
i )− e2 · (∑
i
x(k)i )
2 (3)
−e3 ·
(
∑
i
(x(k)i −ω(k)i /α)2
)
subject to x(k)i = max(0,
ω(k)i − (p(k)i + pb)
α
)
−η ≤ p(k)i − p(k)j ≤ η
0≤ p(k)i ≤ P (4)
e1,e2,e3 are the weight factors. Those weights must be
chosen judiciously depending on the need. The first term
in the objective corresponds to the revenue, the second term
corresponds to the cost of serving the consumption. The third
term in the objective represents a penalty if the consumption
is far away from the consumption of a user when the price
is 0.
The first term in the constraint denotes the fact that user’s
consumption is given by the expression in Observation 1.
The second constraint denotes that even though we have used
discriminatory pricing we have limited the discrimination to
η . The last constraint gives an upper and lower limit of the
decision variable price.
Limiting the Discrimination: Note that the prices differ
between two users by at most η amount. If η = 0, we revert
to the scenario where there is no discrimination. On the other
hand, if we have η = ∞ we revert to the scenario where the
retailer is not bounded by any discrimination level. η is a
policy choice for the social planner. We, numerically, show
the impact of η on each of the objectives.
Formulation 0 is not convex since the first constraint is
a non-linear equality constraint. Thus, it is difficult to obtain
an optimal price. In the following, we relax the constraint
and reformulate the problem as a convex one.
1) Reformulations: We propose three modifications of the
original problem Formulation 0.
Formulation 1:
Max
p(k)i ,x
(k)
i
e1 · (∑
i
(p(k)i + pb)x
(k)
i )− e2 · (∑
i
x(k)i )
2
−e3 ·
(
∑
i
(x(k)i −ω(k)i /α)2
)
Subject to :
x(k)i =
ω(k)i − (p(k)i + pb)
α
∀ i
x(k)i ≥ 0 ∀ i
−η ≤ p(k)i − p(k)j ≤ η ∀ i 6= j
0≤ p(k)i ≤ P ∀ i
(5)
If the reader observes the first constraint, the reader will
discern that we do away with the max term of the original
formulation. Hence, the equality constraint becomes linear
and the overall problem becomes convex. Note that here we
have introduced another constraint where x(k)i ≥ 0, thus, the
price is further restricted from the original formulation.
The above formulation can be alternatively written by
replacing x(k)i with the first constraint as the following
Max
p(k)i
e1 ·∑
i
(p(k)i + pb)(
ω(k)i − (p(k)i + pb)
α
)
−e2 · (∑
i
ω(k)i − (p(k)i + pb)
α
)2− e3 ·∑
i
(
p(k)i + pb
α
)2
Subject to :
p(k)i + pb ≤ ω(k)i ∀ i
−η ≤ p(k)i − p(k)j ≤ η ∀ i 6= j
0≤ p(k)i ≤ P ∀ i
(6)
Formulation 2:
Max
p(k)i ,x
(k)
i
e1 · (∑
i
(p(k)i + pb)x
(k)
i )− e2 · (∑
i
x(k)i )
2
−e3 ·
(
∑
i
(x(k)i −ω(k)i /α)2
)
+∑
i
min(0,
ω(k)i − (pb + p(k)i )
α
)
Subject to :
x(k)i =
ω(k)i − (pb + p(k)i )
α
∀ i
−η ≤ p(k)i − p(k)j ≤ η ∀ i 6= j
0≤ p(k)i ≤ P ∀ i
(7)
We can reformulate the above as the following:
Max
p(k)i ,t
(k)
i
e1 ·∑
i
(p(k)i + pb)(
ω(k)i − (p(k)i + pb)
α
)
−e2 · (∑
i
ω(k)i − (p(k)i + pb)
α
)2− e3 ·∑
i
(
p(k)i + pb
α
)2
+∑
i
t(k)i
Subject to :
t(k)i ≤ 0 ∀ i
t(k)i ≤
ω(k)i − (pb + p(k)i )
α
∀ i
−η ≤ p(k)i − p(k)j ≤ η ∀ i 6= j
0≤ p(k)i ≤ P ∀ i
(8)
This formulation is again convex. Note that compared to
Formulation 1, in this formulation, we do not put the hard
constraint of x(k)i ≥ 0 rather we put a penalty if x(k)i is nega-
tive. Thus, this formulation does not restrict the price unlike
in formulation 1. Unlike in formulation 1, in formulation 2,
we need to compute x(k)i separately using Observation 1 after
obtain optimal price.
For both formulations 1 and 2,we observe the following
Theorem 1: If wi ≥ w j, in an optimal price pi ≥ p j for
both formulations 1 and 2. Further, if wi = w j, pi = p j.
Obviously, note that if η = 0, pi = p j. The above result shows
that if η 6= 0, pi can be higher than p j if wi > w j. Thus,
Theorem 1 ensures fairness in the discriminatory setting.
Even though the prices are different, the retailer sets a higher
price to the users who have higher willingness to consumer
more.
Note that Formulation 2 may have x(k)i negative which is
not possible in reality. We, thus, have the last modification.
Formulation 3:
Max
p(k)i ,x
(k)
i
e1 · (∑
i
(p(k)i + pb)x
(k)
i )− e2 · (∑
i
x(k)i )
2
−e3 ·∑
i
(p(k)i + pb)
2− γ∑
i
(x(k)i −
ω(k)i − (pb + p(k)i )
α
)2
Subject to :
x(k)i ≤
ω(k)i
α
∀ i
x(k)i ≥ 0 ∀ i
−η ≤ p(k)i − p(k)j ≤ η ∀ i 6= j
0≤ p(k)i ≤ P ∀ i
(9)
Compared to the first two formulations, the retailer here
obtains both p(k)i and the corresponding x
(k)
i . The first two
constraints provide the upper and lower bounds on x(k)i
respectively. The fourth term in the objective will penalize
if x(k)i is far from
ω(k)i −(pb+p
(k)
i )
α . Thus, instead of the hard
constraints in the first two formulations, here, the retailer
relaxes it and adds a penalty in the objective. Thus, compared
to the first two formulations, this formulation provides a
higher price.
Unlike in Theorem 1 we can not conclusively say whether
the formulation 3 gives prices which are fair. This is because
in this formulation, the retailer here decides over both p(k)i
and x(k)i unlike in formulations 1 and 2.
C. Extension
1) Optimal η: Throughout this section, we assume that
η is a parameter. However, alternatively, we can consider η
as a decision variable. All the reformulated versions would
still remain convex if we make η as a decision variable. The
optimal η∗ would provide the optimal level of discrimination
necessary to achieve optimal price for the retailer.
2) Different α across the users: Throughout this paper,
we assume that α is the same across the users. However, our
analysis will go through even when α is different across the
users. A retailer can estimate α for a user using a regression
model by observing the response of a user following a price
signal. The details have been omitted here owing to the space
constraint.
3) Different mks across the users: We have also assumed
that the minimum inelastic demand requirement is the same
for each user. Our analysis will go through even when mks
are different across the users since the reformulated problems
would remain convex.
IV. OPTIMAL PRICING WHEN USERS HAVE RENEWABLE
RESOURCES
In this section, we consider the scenario where each
consumer has renewable energy generation capabilities. The
renewable energies can range from solar, biomass, to wind
energies. Note that when a user is equipped with renewable
energies, it may feed back energy to the grid. We assume the
popular net-metering mechanism. Thus, the energy which is
fed back is compensated at the same buying price. Thus,
effectively, the consumer only pays for the net energy pur-
chased from the grid. Since a user can technically produce
energy, we denote it as a prosumer (producer+consumer).
A. Decision of Prosumers
In the kth period, consumer i has an solar energy genera-
tion amounting to s(k)i . This is complemented by a purchase
of amount X (k)i from the retailer at rate P
(k)
i . In case, s
(k)
i is
beyond what is required in the household, it sells back Y (k)i
at same retail rate. Z(k)i is the net energy transaction made,
i.e., Z(k)i = X
(k)
i −Y (k)i . We prove that a prosumer does not
purchase and sell-back in the same period2.
Recall from Definition 1 that the prosumer’s utility is
defined as the difference between the convenience derived
from the elastic demand consumption and the price paid
2See Appendix for proof
for the net purchase from the grid. Z(k)i + s
(k)
i is the total
demand consumption by the prosumer in the kth period,
hence Z(k)i + s
(k)
i −mk is the corresponding elastic demand
consumption. Mathematically, thus the utility function is
U (k)i (Z
(k)
i + s
(k)
i −mk,ω(k)i |P(k)i ) =C(Z(k)i + s(k)i −mk),ω(k)i )
−P(k)i Z(k)i
(10)
Recall that mk is the inelastic demand which is required to
be satisfied at any cost. Hence,similar to Observation 1, we
obtain that
Observation 2: The net optimal grid purchase in the kth
period in response to price P(k)i set by the retailer for both
retail and sell-back is given by
Z(k)i = max{mk− s(k)i ,mk− s(k)i +
(ω(k)i −P(k)i )
α
} (11)
Positive Z(k)i indicates that renewable energy generation was
insufficient and purchase was made from the grid to meet
residual demand. While negative Z(k)i indicates that the
renewable energy generated exceeds the requirement or it is
more profitable to sell-back energy by consuming less. Note
that when the grid is congested, the grid can select higher
prices to incentivize the prosumers to sell back more. Thus,
the prosumers may find it more profitable to sell back when
the grid is congested.
B. Retailer’s Decision
The retailer sets price P(k)i for the i
th prosumer in the kth
period. The same price is applicable for both purchase and
sell-back. The prosumer again employs discrminatory price
setting. We, numerically, evaluate the impact of this price
mechanism on the revenue of the retailer and the user’s
utilities in this scenario.
In addition to the assumptions in Section III, we have the
following:
Assumption 2: We assume that the prosumer can accu-
rately predict s(k)i and communicate it to the retailer for each
k.
Note that a prosumer can predict this value fairly accurately
close to the realization time. Since we are employing a real
time price mechanism, it is expected that a prosumer will
inform the estimated value to the retailer 10 minutes before
the start of the period, the retailer will then update the prices
to everyone. We assume that the prosumer will inform the
exact estimated value. With the knowledge of s(k)i and ω
(k)
i
and the form of the convenience function already known, the
retailer also knows the net optimal purchase amount for that
user using Observation 2.
Retailer’s Objectives : As mentioned in Section III, the
retailer will try to maximize her own revenue, minimize the
cost, and maximize the user’s welfare. Thus, the retailer’s
optimization problem is
Formulation 4:
maximize e1(∑
i
PkZ
(k)
i )− e2(∑
i
Z(k)i )
2 (12)
−e3
(
∑
i
(Z(k)i + s
(k)
i −mk−
ω(k)i
α
)2
)
subject to Z(k)i = max(mk− s(k)i ,mk− s(k)i +
ω(k)i −Pk
α
)
0≤∑
i
Z(k)i
0≤ Pk ≤ P (13)
The first term in the objective corresponds to the revenue,
the second term corresponds to the cost of serving the con-
sumption. Note that even when Z(k)i is negative, the retailer
needs to dispatch this additional energy which incurs a cost.
This is because the balance needs to maintained between
the supply and demand, and even when supply exceeds
the demand the retailer pays a penalty for the imbalance.
The third term in the objective represents a penalty if the
consumption is far away from the consumption of a user
when the price is 0.
The first term in the constraint denotes the fact that user’s
consumption is given by the expression in Observation 2. The
second constraint indicates that the retailer should be able to
sell a net positive amount of energy to the users which will
result in her revenue. The last constraint gives an upper and
lower limit of the decision variable price.
Formulation 4 is not convex since the first constraint is
a non-linear equality constraint. Thus, it is difficult to obtain
an optimal price. So, we relax the constraint and reformulate
the problem as a convex one. The reformulations are exactly
identical in structure to the ones provided in Section III and
thus, we omit them here.
V. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS : SIMULATIONS AND
RESULTS
In this section, we numerically validate the formulations
that have been provided above. For sake of simplicity, we
assume α = 2 across all consumers and across all periods
of the day. Consumer preference parameter ω is drawn
uniformly from [3, 7]. ω(k)i depends on the inelastic demand
requirement in a particular period and the following relation-
ship is assumed to hold: ω(k)i = 0.75ωi +0.5mk ∀ i.
A. Optimal Pricing with no renewable resources
• η = 0 : This translates to the case when the pricing is
non-discriminatory in nature. The same price is charged
to all users in a given period. In this segment, we will
investigate the effect of weights e1, e2 and e3 on the
final prices, retailer revenues, elastic load and consumer
welfare. We will also compare results across our 3
formulations to identify which of them reflects reality
the closest.
As we increase e1, prices decrease, but individual elastic
demand consumption increases. This leads to overall
increase in retailer revenues and average consumer
convenience values. Similarly, with increase in e2, prices
increase, hence total elastic load decreases. Retailer
revenue and consumer welfare also go down. The pat-
tern of variation with e3 is identical to e1. The same
trends are observed across all formulations except for
formulation 1 which is apparently insensitive to e1,e2,e3
variation. However, when we decrease e2 by an order
of magnitude, the same trends are observed again.
In general, formulation 1 predicts the lowest prices be-
Fig. 1. Variation of different metrics with e1
cause it tries to ensure that all consumers have positive
elastic demands. So, total elastic loads are very high
which leads to high retailer revenue and high consumer
welfare. However, such high values of elastic load are
not admissible, so formulation 1 is not a very realistic
model. Formulation 2 predicts the highest prices among
all formulations. This was expected because the retailer
has the choice to dissatisfy consumers who have very
low ω values. Prices predicted by formulation 3 are
slightly lower compared to formulation 2, but it errs on
the lower side in calculating consumption, so despite
having lower prices, formulation 2 shows slightly lower
total elastic loads and lower consumer welfare as com-
pared to formulation 2.
• η > 0 : When η > 0, our pricing model becomes
discriminatory in nature, charging different prices to
different users. All our formulations converge in this
setting. We also make several interesting observations
as we vary η . With increase in η , retailer revenues in-
Fig. 2. Variation of revenue and elastic load with eta
Fig. 3. Variation of prices and consumer welfare with eta
crease gradually, which means that this pricing scheme
is lucrative to her. However, total elastic load and av-
erage consumer convenience roughly remains constant.
Rather, the variation (standard deviation) in consumer
elastic consumption gradually goes down. This means
Fig. 4. Variation of std. deviation of elastic demand consumption with eta
that an energy redistribution is taking place, where users
who were earlier consuming less, are charged lower
prices and hence are able to consume more. While
high-end consumers are being charged high prices,
bringing down their elastic consumption. This means
that discriminatory pricing leads to a fairer distribution
of energy in the community where high-end consumers
no longer have an upper hand.
Fig. 5. Price and energy distribution among consumers for discriminatory
pricing
B. Optimal Pricing when users have renewable resources
Now, we discuss the scenario where users have inhouse
renewable energy generation capabilities. We restrict our
analysis to solar energy only. According to our time-slotting
choice, solar power is generated only during periods 2
through 5. Hence, we assume that the retailer uses the
standard model in the first and last periods and reverts to
the net-metering model during the other periods.
We observe that the retailer chooses to offer significantly
high prices during the daytime. This incentivizes her con-
sumers to sell back huge amounts of energy to the grid
by sacrifising convenience, thereby lowering her wholesale-
market purchases. As a result, a significant flattening of
the load-curve is achieved. Retailer revenues also increase
significantly during the daytime due to high prices. Thus,
net-metering is a viable strategy for the retailer also.
Fig. 6.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we developed optimal pricing strategies for
retailers in the scenario where users do not have renewable
energy resources. The pricing model was formulated as
a Stackelberg game and solved by Backward Induction.
The consumer objective was individual utility maximization
Fig. 7.
Fig. 8.
while retailer objective was a weighted average of her
revenues, cost of generation and consumer welfare. We
showed that by appropriately varying weights, the retailer
can prioritize any of the objectives according to necessity.
We also investigated the impact of discriminatory pricing on
the different stakeholders. It was shown that discriminatory
pricing is profitable to the retailer because it leads to higher
revenues, at the same time, it helps in fairer distribution of
energy in the community. In the last segment of the paper,
we extended our model to include the scenario when users
have inhouse renewable energy generation capabilities. With
net-metering in place, it was found that consumers can be
incentivized to sell back large amounts of energy to the grid,
even at the cost of individual convenience, if the prices are
sufficiently high. Significant sell-back flattens the load curve
and minimizes risk of outages.
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VII. APPENDIX
Claim : If a consumer has a higher ω , then the price
charged to that consumer under the discriminatory pricing
regime will be higher.
Proof : Let us start by constructing the Lagrangian to the
constrained retailer-end optimization problem. If we recall,
the constraint set(presented in general form) is as follows:
pi− p j−η ≤ 0 ∀ i 6= j
p j− pi−η ≤ 0 ∀ i 6= j
pi−ui ≤ 0 ∀ i
li− pi ≤ 0 ∀ i
The Lagrangian L is given by the following :
L = e1∑
i
pi
ωi− pi
α
− e2β (∑
i
ωi− pi
α
)2− e3∑
i
(
pi
α
)2
−∑
i
∑
j
λi j(pi− p j−η)−∑
i
∑
j
λ ji(p j− pi−η)
−∑
i
µ+i (pi−ui)−∑
i
µ−i (li− pi)
(14)
Using KKT conditions for stationarity and complementary
slackness, we have the following :
∂L
∂ pi
= e1(
ωi−2pi
α
)+2
e2β
α
(∑
k
ωk− pk
α
)− 2e3 pi
α2
−∑
j 6=i
λi j +∑
j 6=i
λ ji−µ+i +µ−i = 0 ∀ i
(15)
λi j(pi− p j−η) = 0 ∀ i 6= j
λ ji(p j− pi−η) = 0 ∀ i 6= j
µ+i (pi−ui) = 0 ∀ i (16)
µ−i (li− pi) = 0 ∀ i (17)
Now, ui = Min(ωi, P) and li = 0 ∀i. Since li = 0 and pi 6= 0,
we can safely say that µ−i = 0 ∀i. Again, if P is a loose
bound, for all practical purposes, ui = ωi. If ωi− pi = 0, xi
goes to zero, which is undesirable, so we search for potential
maximizer candidates by putting µ+i = 0 ∀i.
Since our aim is to find η∗ which maximizes the objective,
we set η = ∞ so that | (pi − p j) |≤ η is never active.
Therefore, λi j and λ ji go to zero. We now proceed to solve
for pi using the linear system in (15).
We obtain the following :
∑
k
pk =
(e1 +
2Nβe2
α )∑kωk
2(e1 +
e3
α +
Nβe2
α )
(18)
pi =
e1
ωi
α +
2βe2
α2 ∑kωk−
2βe2
α2 ∑k pk
2( e1α +
e3
α2 )
Since pi varies directly as ωi, we conclude that our claim is
justified. Now, let us try to find an expression for η∗. η∗ is
given by the difference between the maximum and minimum
prices when prices are unconstrained. Hence,
η∗ = pmax− pmin = e1α(ωmax−ωmin)2(αe1 + e3) (19)
(20)
Alternate Proof(Shorter, Simpler and Elegant) : Let
(p1, p2, ..pi, ..p j, ..pn) be the optimal price vector obtained
from the discriminatory pricing model. Let if possible, there
exist a pair i, j such that ωi ≥ ω j, but pi ≤ p j.
Since p is the optima, f (p)≥ f (p′) ∀ p′ 6= p.
Now, let us consider a slightly modified price vector where
prices pi and p j are interchanged. We will refer to this new
price vector as q.
f (q)− f (p) = e1
α
(p j(ωi− p j)+ pi(ω j− pi)− pi(ωi− pi)− p j(ω j− p j))
=
e1
α
(p jωi + piω j− piωi− p jω j)
=
e1
α
(ωi−ω j)(p j− pi)≥ 0
Therefore, f (q)≥ f (p). This contradicts our initial assump-
tion that p is the optimal price vector. Hence, pi ≥ p j
∀ ωi ≥ ω j.
To extend the above proof to formulation 2, we need to prove
additionally that :
Min(0,
ωi− p j
α
)+Min(0,
ω j− pi
α
)≥Min(0, ωi− pi
α
)+Min(0,
ω j− p j
α
)
(21)
when ωi ≥ ω j and pi ≤ p j. ωi, ω j, pi and p j can be related
in 24 ways. Because of the already assumed inequalities,
there are 6 possible ways of arrangement. They are as
follows :
• ωi ≥ ω j ≥ p j ≥ pi :
Min(0,
ωi− p j
α
)+Min(0,
ω j− pi
α
)
−Min(0, ωi− pi
α
)−Min(0, ω j− p j
α
) = 0
(22)
• ωi ≥ p j ≥ ω j ≥ pi :
Min(0,
ωi− p j
α
)+Min(0,
ω j− pi
α
)
−Min(0, ωi− pi
α
)−Min(0, ω j− p j
α
) =
p j−ω j
α
≥ 0
(23)
• p j ≥ ωi ≥ ω j ≥ pi :
Min(0,
ωi− p j
α
)+Min(0,
ω j− pi
α
)
−Min(0, ωi− pi
α
)−Min(0, ω j− p j
α
) =
ωi−ω j
α
≥ 0
(24)
• ωi ≥ p j ≥ pi ≥ ω j :
Min(0,
ωi− p j
α
)+Min(0,
ω j− pi
α
)
−Min(0, ωi− pi
α
)−Min(0, ω j− p j
α
) =
p j− pi
α
≥ 0
(25)
• p j ≥ ωi ≥ pi ≥ ω j :
Min(0,
ωi− p j
α
)+Min(0,
ω j− pi
α
)
−Min(0, ωi− pi
α
)−Min(0, ω j− p j
α
) =
ωi− pi
α
≥ 0
(26)
• p j ≥ pi ≥ ωi ≥ ω j :
Min(0,
ωi− p j
α
)+Min(0,
ω j− pi
α
)
−Min(0, ωi− pi
α
)−Min(0, ω j− p j
α
) = 0
(27)
Thus, there is a contradiction again and pi ≥ p j ∀ ωi ≥ ω j.
